Housing dynamics over the business cycle by Kydland, Finn E. et al.
Housing Dynamics over the Business Cycle∗
Finn E. Kydland†, Peter Rupert‡§ and Roman Sˇustek¶
August 19, 2014
Abstract
Housing construction, measured by housing starts, leads GDP in a number of countries.
Measured as residential investment, the lead is observed only in the US and Canada; else-
where, residential investment is coincident. Variants of existing theory, however, predict
housing construction lagging GDP. In all countries in the sample, nominal interest rates are
low ahead of GDP peaks. Introducing fully-amortizing mortgages and an estimated process
for nominal interest rates into a standard model aligns the theory with the observations
on starts; one-period loans are insufficient to generate the lead. Longer time to build then
makes residential investment cyclically coincident.
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1 Introduction
Over the U.S. business cycle, fluctuations in residential investment—i.e., the volume of newly
constructed homes—are well known to systematically lead fluctuations in real GDP (e.g.,
Leamer, 2007). Perhaps due to this ‘leading indicator property’, new housing construc-
tion attracts considerable attention by professional economists. It has been also repeatedly
documented that this observation is at odds with the properties of business cycle models
once the aggregate capital stock is disaggregated into two basic components: residential and
nonresidential (or home and business, as they are sometimes referred to).
For instance, in the home production models of Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991),
Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), and McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997) home in-
vestment is most strongly correlated with past output while business investment has the
strongest correlation with future output—patterns exactly opposite to those observed in
U.S. data. Other models exhibit this anomaly too. For instance, Gomme and Rupert (2007)
consider a model with a more detailed disaggregation of the expenditure side of GDP and es-
timated investment-specific shocks for different types of investment, in addition to standard
technology shocks. Davis and Heathcote (2005) instead disaggregate the production side of
the economy into manufacturing, services, and construction and include estimated technol-
ogy shock processes for each sector. The inverted dynamics of residential and nonresidential
investment, however, persist in both models.1
Two studies achieve partial success. Gomme, Kydland, and Rupert (2001) demonstrate
that longer time to build in nonresidential—than residential—construction can change the
lead-lag pattern of residential investment in relation to nonresidential investment, but not
in relation to output. Fisher (2007) resolves the phase shift between the two types of in-
vestment by making an (empirically supported) assumption that home capital is, at least
1The reason why existing models predict the opposite pattern to that in the data is that output produced
by business capital has more uses than output produced by home capital: the former can be either consumed
or invested in both business and home capital, whereas the latter can only be consumed (e.g, as housing
services). Investment in business capital thus allows better intertemporal smoothing of consumption of both
types of goods, market and home. This provides a strong incentive to build up business capital first, in
response to shocks that increase market output.
partially, complementary to business capital in market production. The mechanism also gen-
erates business investment lagging output, but still fails to produce home investment leading
output.2
While the cyclical properties of residential (and nonresidential) investment have been well
established for the U.S., little is known about the properties of these data in other countries.
Is the U.S. experience unique and data from other countries support the existing theory?
Or do the data from other countries make the need for improving the theory even more
pressing? The first objective of the paper, therefore, is to provide international evidence on
the dynamics of the two types of investment.
The empirical findings can be summarized as follows. In a sample of developed economies,
only Canada exhibits the lead in residential investment observed in the U.S. Nonetheless,
international data do not support the existing models either; other countries have residential
investment, more or less, coincident with GDP. Furthermore, in all countries nonresidential
investment is either lagging or coincident with GDP, not leading as most existing models
predict.
International data on housing starts—the number of housing units whose construction
commenced in a given period—make the case against the theory even stronger: nearly all
countries in the sample exhibit housing starts strongly leading GDP. Available data on
completions, together with the details of national accounting practices, then suggest that
the discrepancy between the timing, in relation to output, of housing starts and residential
investment occurs due to longer residential time to build in some countries than in the U.S.
During the time to build period, national accounts record in each quarter a construction
project’s ‘value put in place’ as a part of residential investment. Various reasons for longer
time to build are discussed.
An important aspect of housing markets in most developed economies is a reliance of
homeowners on mortgage finance to purchase a property. Furthermore, the cyclical dynamics
2Parallel to this literature are monetary models of Edge (2000), Li and Chang (2004), and Dressler and Li
(2009) that focus on replicating the differing responses of the two types of investment to standard monetary
policy shocks, as reported by Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
2
of mortgage rates—and nominal interest rates, both long and short, more generally—are
strikingly similar across countries. Specifically, mortgage rates are negatively correlated
with future GDP and positively correlated with past GDP, suggesting that mortgage finance
is relatively cheap ahead of a peak in GDP.3
As a second objective, the paper evaluates the plausibility of the hypothesis suggested by
the data within a stylized model belonging to the class of home production models mentioned
above. Specifically, the paper asks (i) if the dynamics of nominal interest rates observed in
the data transmit into similar cyclical variations in the real cost of mortgage finance and
if such variations are sufficient to overturn the standard predictions of the theory; and (ii)
if time to build in residential investment can then account for the discrepancies between
the timing of housing starts and residential investment. Various idiosyncracies of individ-
ual countries are abstracted from. To this end, long-term fully-amortizing mortgages—a
dominant form of house purchase loans in developed economies—and residential time to
build are introduced into the model of Gomme et al. (2001).4 Two main types of mortgages
are considered: fixed-rate mortgages (FRM) and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM). Most
countries can be broadly classified as having either FRM or ARM as their typical mortgage
contract.5 The exogenous input into the model is an estimated VAR process for total factor
productivity, the nominal mortgage interest rate, and the inflation rate. In the absence of
an off-the-shelf structural model for the observed lead-lag dynamics of nominal interest rates
3In all countries in the sample, nominal mortgage rates have similar dynamics as government bond
yields of comparable maturities. The ‘inverted’ lead-lag property of U.S. government bond yields in
relation to output has been previously noted by, for instance, King and Watson (1996) and, more re-
cently, Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2010). The same pattern is documented for other countries by
Henriksen, Kydland, and Sˇustek (2013). Unfortunately, a theory that would successfully account for this
phenomenon is yet to be developed.
4Debt finance in the model is assumed only for residential investment. This is justified by a well-known
finding in the corporate finance literature that in major developed economies, on average, only 16-23% of
long-term assets in the nonfinancial corporate sector are financed through debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995);
nonresidential investment is essentially financed through retained earnings. To the extent that debt is used,
it is nonamortizing debt with typical maturity of only five years and a final balloon payment. Debt finance
is more commonly used for short-term assets.
5Research is still inconclusive on the causes of the cross-country heterogeneity in the use of FRM v.s.
ARM, but the likely reasons have to do with government interventions, historical path dependence, and
whether mortgage lenders raise funds through capital markets or bank deposits (e.g., Miles, 2004; Campbell,
2012).
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noted above, this guarantees that the cyclical pattern of the mortgage rate (and inflation) in
the model is as in the data. The production possibilities frontier is allowed to be nonlinear
so that the relative price of newly constructed homes is time varying. A government closes
the model, ensuring that the economy’s resource constraint holds.
In a baseline case with one-period residential time to build, and multi-period nonresi-
dential time to build, the model exhibits lead-lag patterns of residential and nonresidential
investment similar to those in the U.S. and Canada, while also being in line with standard
business cycle moments as much as other models in the literature. Introducing into the model
a multi-period time to build in residential construction facilitates the distinction between
housing starts and residential investment. While mortgage finance is crucial for producing
housing starts leading output, longer time to build pushes residential investment towards
being coincident with output. In both versions, mortgage finance has also an indirect effect
on nonresidential investment—as households want to keep consumption relatively smooth,
when movements in residential investment of the magnitude observed in the data occur
ahead of an increase in GDP and income, nonresidential investment is delayed, making it
lag output. The relative price of newly constructed homes responds to housing demand and
exhibits cyclical volatility and comovement with output similar to those in the data.
The real cost of mortgages is summarized in the form of an endogenous time-varying
wedge in the Euler equation for residential capital. The wedge, working like a tax/subsidy
on residential investment, or like a housing taste shock (e.g., Liu, Wang, and Zha, 2013),
depends on expected future real mortgage installments over the life of the loan, discounted
by the household’s stochastic discount factor. Thus, unlike observed nominal mortgage
rates, the wedge captures the true cost of the mortgage to the household in the model. Its
cyclical behavior, nonetheless, confirms the conjecture drawn from the observed dynamics of
mortgage rates. That is, that mortgages are relatively cheap, from households’ perspective,
ahead of a GDP peak.6
6These findings are consistent with earlier studies of the U.S. housing market (e.g.,
Kearl, Rosen, and Swan, 1975; Kearl, 1979), which find that the nominal interest rate has a negative,
statistically significant, coefficient in housing investment regression equations.
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Following Iacoviello (2005), a number of authors have studied housing and housing finance
in DSGE models (further discussion of the literature is provided at the end of Section 3.2).7
There are three major features that distinguish our model from that literature. First, we
are interested only in the cost of housing finance and how it affects housing investment.
The DSGE literature, in contrasts, focuses on the role of housing finance in facilitating
collateralized borrowing for consumption purposes (i.e., consumption of the market good).
Our model therefore abstracts from that channel. Second, the DSGE models usually do
not include nonresidential capital (one of the few exceptions is Iacoviello and Pavan, 2013).
However, as the home production literature demonstrates, the presence of nonresidential
capital has important implications for the cyclical behavior of residential capital. And third,
and most importantly, housing finance in the DSGE literature involves a sequence of one-
period loans, whereas we consider long-term fully-amortizing loans. This feature of the loan
contract turns out to be crucial for generating the lead in residential investment. Even in the
presence of the estimated process for nominal interest rates and inflation, one-period loans
do not generate the lead; long-term mortgage loans provide a much stronger propagation
mechanism transmitting the observed cyclical movements in the nominal interest rate into
sizable fluctuations in the real cost of housing finance and thus in residential investment.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the empirical findings. Sec-
tion 3 describes the model. Section 4 explains how nominal interest rates affect housing
investment. Section 5 reports findings from the main computational experiments. Section 6
demonstrates the quantitative importance of mortgages. Section 7 concludes. The paper has
three appendixes (for online publication only). Appendix A provides a description of the in-
ternational data used in Section 2. Appendix B contains some additional derivations related
to Sections 3 and 4 and describes the computation of the equilibrium. Finally, Appendix C
contains estimates of the exogenous stochastic processes used in Sections 5 and 6.
7The term ‘DSGE’ is used here to refer to this literature, as opposed to the home production literature
reviewed above.
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2 Leads and lags in investment data
The empirical analysis is based on quarterly data for the following countries and peri-
ods: Australia (1959.Q3-2006.Q4), Belgium (1980.Q1-2006.Q4), Canada (1961.Q1-2006.Q4),
France (1971.Q1-2006.Q4), the U.K. (1965.Q1-2006.Q4), and the U.S. (1958.Q1-2006.Q4).
These are the only countries for which the breakdown of total investment into residential
and nonresidential is available from at least 1980 (we regard a period of about 25 years as
the shortest that allows a sensible discussion of business cycles). Appendix A provides a
description of the data and lists the availability of the data for other countries.
All investment data are measured as chained-weighted quantity indexes and, subject to
slightly different treatment of software expenditures, are conceptually comparable across
countries (European Cenral Bank, 2005). As in the related studies, the data are logged
and filtered with the Hodrick-Prescott filter and the empirical regularities are summarized
in the form of correlations with real (chained-weighted) GDP at various leads and lags;
i.e., by corr(xt+j, GDPt) for j = {−4,−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, where xt+j and GDPt are,
respectively, the percentage deviations of the variable of interest and real GDP from a HP
filter trend. A variable is said to be leading the cycle (meaning leading real GDP) if the
highest correlation is at j < 0, as lagging the cycle if the highest correlation is at j > 0, and
as coincident with the cycle if the highest correlation is at j = 0.8
2.1 Total, residential, and nonresidential investment
To set the stage, Figure 1 plots the cross-correlations for total investment, referred to in
national accounts as gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), which accounts on average for
a little over 20% of GDP. The figure caption contains volatilities of the investment data,
measured by the standard deviation of investment relative to that of real GDP. As the figure
8The findings are not particularly sensitive to if, instead, the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass
filter is used. Due to the well-known end-point problems of the filters, the ongoing recessions are not included
in the sample. Nevertheless, observations of turning points during the 2006-2008 period are consistent with
the empirical regularities documented in this section.
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shows, in all six countries total investment is coincident with GDP. In addition, the volatility
of total investment is between 2.5 times to 4 times the volatility of GDP, which is in the
ballpark of the much-cited volatility of U.S. investment (about 3 times the volatility of GDP)
and the prediction of a prototypical business cycle model with standard calibration.
Figure 2 displays the cross-correlations for residential and nonresidential structures, which
together with equipment & software make up GFCF (nonresidential structures make up on
average about 25%, equipment & software 45%, and residential structures 30% of GFCF);
volatilities of the data are again reported in the figure caption. Residential structures include
new houses, apartment buildings, and other dwellings, whereas nonresidential structures
include new office buildings, retail parks, production plants, power plants etc. We will often
refer to residential structures as ‘residential investment’ and to nonresidential structures as
‘nonresidential investment’.9 The empirical regularity discussed in the Introduction that
over the U.S. business cycle residential investment leads GDP is clearly evident. The chart
for the U.S. also shows that nonresidential investment has the opposite dynamics to those of
residential investment, lagging GDP over the business cycle. Such a stark difference in the
dynamic properties of residential and nonresidential investment is to a lesser extent observed
also in Canada, but in the remaining countries the two types of investment tend to be, more
or less, coincident with GDP.
In order to get a sense of the significance of the leads and lags (or their absence) in the
charts of Figure 2, the following test is carried out. Using a standard block bootstrap with
nonstochastic overlapping blocks (see, e.g., Hardle, Horowitz, and Kreiss, 2003), 10,000 pairs
of artificial data series for investment and GDP, of the same length as the historical data,
are drawn for each country. For each artificial sample, the cross-correlations are computed
and the j ∈ {−4, ..., 0, ..., 4} at which the highest correlation occurs is recorded. Figure 3
plots the histograms of these occurrences at different j’s.10 As the histograms show, for
9In the case of Belgium and France the cross-correlations are for the sum of nonresidential structures and
equipment & software as the two series, unfortunately, are not available individually. In the countries for
which the breakdown is available, equipment & software behaves, qualitatively, like nonresidential structures.
10The length of each block in the bootstrap is set equal to 20 quarters in order to address the serial
correlation of around 0.9 in the historical data. While the accuracy of block bootstrap methods can be
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residential investment, the U.S. and Canada are the only countries for which the highest
correlation is at a lead (i.e., at a j < 0) in at least 95% of the draws, while for nonresidential
investment only the U.S. has the highest correlation at a lag (i.e., at a j > 0) in at least 95%
of the draws. Nevertheless, with the exception of Belgium, for which the test is inconclusive
even at a 90% confidence level, all countries exhibit residential investment either leading
or coincident with GDP; i.e., the highest correlation occurs at a j ≤ 0 in more than 95%
of the draws. And with the exception of the U.K., for which the test is inconclusive, all
countries exhibit nonresidential investment either lagging or coincident with GDP; i.e., the
highest correlation occurs at a j ≥ 0 in more than 95% of the draws. The predictions of the
business cycle models with disaggregated investment reviewed in the Introduction are thus
not supported by the available international data.
2.2 Housing starts
While the U.S. and Canada look different from the other countries by exhibiting a cyclical
lead of residential investment, there is much more uniformity across the sample countries
in terms of the lead-lag dynamics of housing starts.11 The start of housing construction
is defined consistently across countries as the beginning of excavation for the foundation
of a residential building (single family or multifamily) and every month detailed surveys
of home builders record the number of such activities. The top half of Figure 4 plots the
cross-correlations with GDP for the historical data (volatilities are in the figure caption); the
data are again logged and HP-filtered. As is visually apparent, housing starts lead GDP in
all countries, possibly with the exception of Belgium. The bottom half of the figure reports
the results of a similar robustness check as in the case of investment. In 95% of the draws
the lead occurs in the case of Canada, the U.K., and the U.S and in 90% of the draws also
sensitive to the choice of the block length (Hardle et al., 2003), the main takeaway form Figure 3 is unaffected
by changing the length by up to +/- six quarters.
11The time periods for housing starts differ slightly from the time periods for residential structures due to
differences in data availability. Housing starts are for the following periods: Australia (1965.Q3-2006.Q4),
Belgium (1968.Q1-2006.Q4), Canada (1960.Q1-2006.Q4), France (1974.Q1-2006.Q4), the U.K. (1978.Q1-
2006.Q4), and the U.S. (1959.Q1-2006.Q4). Details of the data are provided in Appendix A.
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in the case of Australia and France.
2.3 Construction lead times
While housing starts record the number of housing units whose construction commenced,
residential investment in national accounts records value put in place on residential projects
in a given quarter, as estimated from surveys of home builders (European Commission, 1999;
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2009).12 Construction projects that take longer to complete
therefore have value put in place recorded over more quarters. In the U.S., the Survey of
Construction provides details on construction lead times (time to build) for different types
of residential structures. The average period from start to completion for a typical single
family structure built for sale is 5.5 months; for an owner-built13 single family structure the
lead time is 10 months; and for multifamily structures the lead time is 10 months for the
aggregate and 13 months for 20+ unit structures. The lead times for the different structure
types are approximately constant over time. In national accounts, single-family units make
up on average about 80% of new permanent residential structures while owner-built units’
share in single-family units is on average only 14%. Residential investment in the U.S. thus
mainly reflects the relatively short lead time of single family units built for sale.
In addition to data on housing starts, the U.S. Survey of Construction provides quarterly
data on completions for single and multifamily structures (data for the individual structure
types within single and multifamily structures are available only from 1999 and thus too short
for our purposes). The cross-correlations of starts and completions with GDP are reported
in Table 1. They reflect the lead times noted above: for single family units, starts lead GDP
by three quarters while completions lead by only two quarters; for multifamily units, starts
lead GDP by two quarters while completions lag GDP by two quarters (the multifamily data
are for 5+ unit structures). The table also reports cross-correlations for single family and
12Residential investment also includes capital expenses on improvements and brokers’ commissions on
sales.
13Custom-built structures whereby an individual commissions an architect and a builder to build a house
for own use.
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multifamily residential investment. The highest cross-correlations lie in-between the highest
cross-correlations for starts and completions for the respective structure types: single family
structures lead GDP by two quarters and multifamily structures are coincident with GDP.
Information on construction lead times in other countries is scarce. However, exploiting
the above properties of the U.S. data, we can use available data on housing completions in
other countries, published alongside the housing starts data, to obtain estimates of construc-
tion lead times. The only countries for which long enough completions data are available
are Australia and the Unite Kingdom. Table 1 shows that in Australia housing starts lead
by two quarters while completions are coincident with GDP and in the United Kingdom
housing starts lead by two quarters while completions lag GDP by one quarter. These cor-
relations suggest up to three-quarter time to build in Australia and up to four-quarter time
to build in the U.K. As in the case of the U.S., in both Australia and the U.K. the highest
cross-correlation of residential investment lies in-between the highest cross-correlations of
starts and completions.
Why there may be differences in residential time to build across developed economies?
Ball (2003) conducts a cross-country comparative study of the structure and practices of
homebuilding industries. He points out substantial variations across countries in the mate-
rials used, the extent of pre-fabrication, supply chain efficiency, and regulatory constraints.
In addition, the composition of housing investment differs across countries. In Belgium and
France, multifamily structures account for almost 40% and owner-built single family struc-
tures for 45− 50% of new construction (Dol and Haffner, 2010). Assuming that multifamily
and owner-built structures in Belgium and France take at least as long time to build as in
the U.S., the lead times for the residential sectors as a whole in the two countries are likely
to be close to four quarters.
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2.4 Regulation Q
Regulation Q is sometimes evoked as a reason for the leading behavior of residential invest-
ment over the U.S. business cycle (e.g., Bernanke, 2007). This regulation set ceilings on
interest rates that savings banks and savings and loans—the main mortgage lenders before
mid-1980s—were allowed to pay on deposits. When interest rates increased, these institu-
tions experienced deposit outflows and had to cut mortgage lending, thus causing decline in
construction activity and possibly a wider recession. Regulation Q was eventually abolished
in 1980 and phased out during the following four years.
In order to assess the effect of Regulation Q, the top half of Table 2 reports the cross-
correlations of single family residential investment with GDP in two subsamples: 1959.Q1-
1983.Q4 and 1984.Q1-2006.Q4. The focus is on single family structures as the multifamily
market was strongly affected by tax code changes that occurred in the 1980s (Colton and Collignon,
2001). The key observation is that investment in residential structures leads GDP in both
periods, even though, admittedly, the correlations at all leads and lags are weaker in the
second period than in the first period. Thus, while Regulation Q likely played a role in
the cyclical dynamics of residential investment in the first period—possibly accounting for
the stronger correlations—it cannot be the only reason for why movements in residential
investment precede movements in GDP.
2.5 Mortgage rates
An important feature of housing markets in most developed economies is that the acquisi-
tion of a residential property relies on debt financing. In the U.S., based on historical data
from the Survey of Construction, on average 94% of new single-family house purchases are
financed by a mortgage (76% by a 30-year conventional mortgage and 18% by FHA/VA
insured mortgages). The remaining 6% are cash purchases. Furthermore, the cross-sectional
average of the loan-to-value ratio for newly-built homes conventional mortgages is 76% and
this ratio has been remarkable stable over time, fluctuating within a range of a couple of
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percentage points (Federal Housing Finance Agency, Monthly Interest Rate Survey, Table
10). About 25% of new single-family homes are on average sold at the development stage,
40% are sold during the construction process, and 35% are sold after completion (Survey of
Construction). Issuance of home mortgage loans, unsurprisingly, therefore exhibits similar
lead-lag pattern as single-family residential investment, leading GDP by two quarters, as the
bottom half of Table 2 shows.14 Even though the extent of mortgage finance varies across the
countries in the sample, mortgage loans play an important role. The typical loan-to-value ra-
tio varies across-countries from 70 to 90% (Ahearne, Ammer, Doyle, Kole, and Martin, 2005;
Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca, 2013) and mortgage debt outstanding in 2009 was equivalent
to 40 to 90% of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2011).
The next section derives the real cost of a mortgage to a representative household. Here,
Table 3 reports the lead-lag dynamics of two variables that affect the cost, the nominal
mortgage interest rate and the inflation rate. According to a number of studies (e.g.,
Scanlon and Whitehead, 2004; Calza et al., 2013), countries can be generally characterized
as either FRM dominated or ARM dominated, though the cross-country heterogeneity of
mortgage market structures is yet to be understood (Campbell, 2012). For each country in
the sample, Table 3 reports the standard deviation (relative to GDP) and cross-correlations
with GDP of the nominal interest rate on the country’s typical mortgage. In addition, the
table reports the statistics for government bond yields of maturities comparable to the period
for which the mortgage rate in the typical mortgage contract is fixed.15 The third variable in
the table is the inflation rate. For future reference we also include the yield on U.S. 3-month
Treasury bills. The table reveals a striking similarity across countries in the cyclical dy-
14The mortgage loan data are for the net change in mortgage debt outstanding obtained from the Flow
of Funds Accounts, Table F.217, and deflated with the GDP deflator. Flow of Funds tables report home
mortgages, defined as mortgages for 1-4 family properties. The fraction of new construction accounted for
by 2-4 family properties is, however, negligible (completions data from the Survey of Construction). Home
mortgages are thus a good proxy for single family property mortgages. The findings are similar whether or
not home equity lines of credit, broadly available from mid-1990s, are included.
15Specifically, for FRM countries we take par yields on coupon government bonds of maturities close to the
periods for which FRM mortgage rates are fixed; for ARM countries we take 3-month Treasury bill yields, as
mortgage rates on ARMs are set, after some initial period, as a margin over a short-term government bond
yield.
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namics of these variables: generally, all three variables are negatively correlated with future
GDP and positively correlated with past GDP. Thus, on average, nominal interest rates and
inflation rates are relatively low before a GDP peak, tend to increase as GDP increases, and
reach their peak a few quarters after a peak in GDP. This pattern of nominal interest rates
and inflation rates has been previously documented by King and Watson (1996) for the U.S.
and by Henriksen et al. (2013) for a number of developed economies. The table also shows
that the cross-correlations of mortgage rates are similar to those of government bond yields.
3 A business cycle model with mortgage loans
Motivated by the above empirical findings, this section introduces mortgages into a business
cycle model with home and market sectors studied by Gomme et al. (2001), henceforth
referred to as GKR. It is worth pointing out at the outset that we do not model the underlying
reasons giving rise to the demand for mortgages, such as the lumpiness of house purchases,
the tax code, or the preference for owning v.s. renting. Modeling demand for mortgages from
first principles would make the model unnecessarily complex for the task at hand, which is
to investigate the impact of nominal interest rates on the real mortgage cost and residential
investment. For this purpose, we simply assume that a fraction of new housing is financed
through mortgages and calibrate this fraction from the data. As noted above, in the data
this fraction is approximately constant over time.16
3.1 Preferences and technology
A representative household has preferences over consumption of a market-produced good
cMt, a home-produced good cHt, and leisure, which is given by 1 − hMt − hHt, where hMt
16Gervais (2002), Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2008), and Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009)
develop models with many of the micro-level details we abstract from. Their focus, however, is on steady-
state analysis. Campbell and Cocco (2003) model in detail a single household’s mortgage choice in partial
equilibrium, while Koijen, Van Hemert, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) embed a two-period version of such
a problem in general equilibrium with aggregate shocks. Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) construct a general
equilibrium model with some of the features in Gervais (2002) and aggregate shocks. Housing finance in
their model, however, takes the form of a one-period loan.
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is time spent in market work and hHt is time spent in home work. The preferences are
summarized by the utility function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, 1− hMt − hHt) , β ∈ (0, 1), (1)
where u(., .) has all the standard properties and ct is a composite good, given by a constant-
returns-to-scale aggregator c(cMt, cHt). Time spent in home work is combined with home
capital kHt to produce the home good according to a production function
cHt = AHG(kHt, hHt), (2)
where G(., .) has all the standard properties. In contrast to the home production litera-
ture, we abstract from durable goods and equate home capital with residential structures
when mapping the model to data. Home capital will therefore be referred to as ‘residential
capital’.17
Output of the market-produced good yt is determined by an aggregate production func-
tion
yt = AMtF (kMt, hMt), (3)
operated by identical perfectly competitive firms. Here, AMt is total factor productivity
(TFP) and kMt is market capital, which will be referred to as ‘nonresidential capital’.
18
Firms rent labor and capital services from households at a wage rate wt and a capital rental
rate rt, respectively. The market-produced good can be used for consumption, investment in
17cHt is thus consumption of housing services and hHt is interpreted as time devoted to home maintenance
and leisure enjoyed at home, as opposed to, for instance, a bar. Under enough separability in utility and
production functions, which will be imposed under calibration, the period utility function can be rewritten
such that it is a function of cMt, hMt, and kHt (Greenwood, Rogerson, and Wright, 1995). This makes it
comparable to models that put housing directly in the utility function.
18Notice that, in contrast to AMt, which is time varying (due to shocks), AH is constant. GKR show
that under enough separability in utility and production functions, which will be imposed under calibration,
shocks to AH do not affect market variables (i.e., time spent in market work, consumption of the market-
produced good, and accumulation of the two types of capital). This is convenient as it allows abstracting
from home-production TFP shocks, which cannot be measured outside of the model.
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residential capital, xHt, and investment in nonresidential capital, xMt. For now, it is assumed
that the marginal rate of transformation between these uses is equal to one.
We start with one-period residential time to build. Residential capital therefore evolves
as
kH,t+1 = (1− δH)kHt + xHt, (4)
where δH ∈ (0, 1). As in GKR, nonresidential capital has a J-period time to build, where J
is an integer greater than one. Specifically, an investment project started in period t becomes
a part of the capital stock only in period t + J . However, the project requires value to be
put in place throughout the construction process from period t to t+ J − 1. In particular, a
fraction φj ∈ [0, 1] of the project must be invested in period t+ J − j, j ∈ {1, ..., J}, where
j denotes the number of periods from completion and
∑J
j=1 φj = 1. Let sjt be the size of
projects that in period t are j periods from completion. Total nonresidential investment
(i.e., investment across all on-going projects) in period t is thus
xMt =
J∑
j=1
φjsjt (5)
and the projects evolve recursively as
sj−1,t+1 = sjt, j = 2, . . . , J, (6)
kM,t+1 = (1− δM)kMt + s1t, (7)
where δM ∈ (0, 1).
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3.2 Mortgage loans
Up until now, the setup is exactly the same as in GKR. What makes the current model
different is that residential investment is subject to a financing constraint
lt = θptxHt, (8)
where lt is the nominal value of a mortgage loan extended in period t, θ ∈ [0, 1) is a loan-to-
value ratio, and pt is the aggregate price level (the price of the market good in ‘dollars’); for
now, we abstract from the relative price of xHt—i.e., the price of newly constructed homes
in terms of the other market goods—but introduce it into the model in Section 5.19 Notice
that the constraint (8) is different from that in Iacoviello (2005) and similar models. Here,
the loan taken out in period t is only used to finance new homes constructed in period t,
whereas in Iacoviello (2005), a loan taken out in period t is collateralized by the period-t+1
housing stock. In this sense, our loan resembles a first mortgage, whereas that of Iacoviello
is closer to a home equity loan or refinancing.
Mortgage debt is paid off by regular nominal installments. The representative household’s
budget constraint is therefore
cMt + xMt + xHt = (1− τr)rtkMt + (1− τw)wthMt + δMτrkMt + lt
pt
− mt
pt
+ τt, (9)
where τr is a tax rate on income from nonresidential capital, τw is a tax rate on labor income,
τt is a lump-sum transfer, and mt are nominal installments on outstanding mortgage debt.
20
19Strictly speaking, the constraint is lt ≤ θptxHt, but it is assumed to be binding in all states of the
world. If it is slack, the choice of xHt is independent of the choice of lt and housing finance does not affect
equilibrium allocations—the wedge in the Euler equation for housing derived below becomes zero and the
properties of the model become the same as in GKR. An empirical justification for our assumption, noted
above, is that the mean cross-sectional loan-to-value ratio for conventional single family newly-built home
mortgages has been historically approximately constant (about 0.76, with a standard deviation of less than 2
percentage points), despite large changes in mortgage rates and other economic conditions; Federal Housing
Finance Agency, Monthly Interest Rate Survey, Table 10, 1963-2007.
20τr and τw are constant and, as in the rest of the home production literature, are introduced into the
model purely for calibration purposes; τt is time-varying and its role is to ensure that the economy’s resource
constraint holds.
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The installments are given as
mt = (Rt + δDt)dt, (10)
where dt is the nominal mortgage debt outstanding, Rt is an effective net interest rate on
the outstanding mortgage debt, and δDt ∈ (0, 1) is an effective amortization rate of the
outstanding mortgage debt. Notice that δDt ∈ (0, 1) implies that mt > Rtdt; i.e., a part of
the outstanding debt is amortized each period. Mortgages are only either FRM or ARM.
The variables dt, Rt, and δDt are state variables evolving recursively according to the laws
of motion
dt+1 = (1− δDt)dt + lt, (11)
δD,t+1 = (1− νt)f(δDt) + νtκ, (12)
Rt+1 =
 (1− νt)Rt + νtit, if FRM,it, if ARM. (13)
Here, νt ≡ lt/dt+1 is the share of current loans in the new stock of debt and (1 − νt) ≡
(1 − δDt)dt/dt+1 is the share of outstanding unamortized debt in the new stock of debt. In
addition, it is the nominal mortgage interest rate on new loans and κ ∈ (0, 1) is the initial
amortization rate of new loans. Finally, f(δDt) is a smooth function with the following
properties: f(δDt) ∈ (0, 1), f ′(δDt) > 0, f ′′(δDt) > 0 for δDt close to zero, and f ′′(δDt) < 0
for δDt close to one. Notice that combining equations (10) and (11) gives the evolution of
mortgage debt in a more familiar form: dt+1 = (1 +Rt)dt −mt + lt.
3.2.1 An example
It is worth pausing here to explain in more detail the laws of motion (11)-(13) and their
implications for the time path of mortgage installments (10). For this purpose, let us suppose
that the representative household has no outstanding debt (d0 = 0) and takes out a FRM
in period t = 0 in the amount l0 > 0. Let us further assume that the household does not
take out any new mortgage loans in subsequent periods (i.e., l1 = l2 = ... = 0). Equations
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(10)-(13) then yield the following path of mortgage installments: In period t = 1, the
household’s outstanding debt is d1 = l0, the initial amortization rate at which this debt will
be reduced going into the next period is δD1 = κ, and the effective interest rate is R1 = i0.
Mortgage payments in t = 1 are thus m1 = (R1 + δD1)d1 = (i0 + κ)l0. In period t = 2 the
outstanding debt is d2 = (1 − κ)l0 and is reduced at a rate δD2 = f(κ) > κ going into the
next period. The interest rate R2 is again equal to i0. Mortgage payments in t = 2 are thus
m2 = (R2 + δD2)d2 = [i0 + f(κ)](1 − κ)l0 and so on. Notice that whereas the interest part
of mortgage payments, Rtdt, declines as debt gets amortized, the amortization part, δDtdt,
increases if δDt grows at a fast enough rate. An appropriate choice of f(.) ensures that the
amortization part increases at such a rate so as to keep mt approximately constant for a
specified period of time (e.g. 30-years), thus approximating the defining characteristic of a
standard FRM. A simple polynomial f(δDt) = δ
α
Dt, with α = 0.9946 (and κ = 0.00162), is
found to work fairly well, but higher-order polynomials can also be used for further precision
(see Appendix B for details). An ARM works similarly, except that the interest part varies
in line with changes in it.
3.2.2 The general case
In the computational experiments, the representative household starts with the economy’s
initial (steady-state) outstanding debt and, in response to shocks, chooses xHt, and thus lt,
every period. In this case, δD,t+1 evolves as the weighted average of the amortization rate
of the outstanding stock, f(δDt), and the initial amortization rate of new loans, κ, with the
weights being the relative sizes of the current stock and flow in the new stock, respectively.
Similarly, in the case of FRM, Rt+1 evolves as the weighted average of the interest rate paid
on the outstanding stock, Rt, and the interest rate charged for new loans, it. In the case of
ARM, the current interest rate applies to both, the new loan and the outstanding stock.21
21Most existing DSGE models with housing assume one-period loans. The interest rate applied to the
loan is either the current short-term interest rate (e.g., Iacoviello, 2005, and many others), a weighted
average of the current and past interest rates (Rubio, 2011), or evolving in a sticky Calvo-style fashion
(Graham and Wright, 2007). The loan in Iacoviello (2005) is equivalent to δDt = 1 for all t, whereas the
loans in Rubio (2011) and Graham and Wright (2007) are equivalent to δDt = 1 for all t in equation (11),
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3.3 Exogenous process and closing the model
The price level pt evolves as pt = (1+pit)pt−1, where the inflation rate pit follows an estimated
VAR(n) process with the current nominal mortgage rate it and market TFP: zt+1b(L) = εt+1,
where zt = [logAMt, it, pit]
>, εt+1 ∼ N(0,Σ), and b(L) = I− b1L− ...− bnLn (L being the lag
operator). As households in the model have access to only either FRM or ARM, the mortgage
rate in the VAR is either an FRM rate or an ARM rate, depending on the experiment. Note
that, as we are interested in unconditional moments of the data generated by the model, no
identification assumptions on the orthogonality of shocks in the VAR process are needed. The
model is closed by including a government, ensuring that the economy’s resource constraint
holds. The government collects revenues from capital and labor taxes and operates the
mortgage market by collecting mortgage instalments and providing new mortgage loans.
Each period the government balances its budget by lump-sum transfers to the household,
τt = τrrtkMt + τwwthMt − τrδMkMt +mt/pt − lt/pt, which can be negative. New mortgage
debt is thus determined by household demand for new housing and the government adjusts
τt to meet the demand.
The exogenous VAR process is a reduced form capturing the aspects of financial markets
behind the observed lead-lag dynamics of nominal interest rates, both at the long end (FRM)
and the short end (ARM) of the yield curve. As mentioned above, in the absence of off-the-
shelf structural model, the VAR process ensures that the lead-lag pattern of the mortgage
rate (and the inflation rate) is as in the data. Koijen et al. (2009) take a similar approach,
appending their model economy with a reduced-form model for interest rates in order to gen-
erate their realistic dynamics. As mortgages are priced exogenously, the stochastic discount
factor of the household in the model is implicitly different from the pricing kernel reflected
in the exogenous process for mortgage rates. If the two were the same, mortgage finance
would play no role. Inequality between the stochastic discount factor of the household and
but not in equation (13). Calza et al. (2013) model FRM as a two-period loan and ARM as a one-period
loan. The housing debt of Campbell and Hercowitz (2006) is equivalent to equations (11)-(13) when the
loan is ARM and the amortization rate δDt ∈ (0, 1) is held constant.
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the pricing kernel in financial markets (due to, e.g., market incompleteness, segmentation, or
regulation) is a general necessary condition for mortgages to affect housing decisions. This
is not to say that otherwise there would be no borrowing and lending, but rather that the
form of the loan contract, short-term v.s. long-term or FRM v.s. ARM, would be irrelevant.
4 The effect of mortgages on housing investment
This section characterizes the effect of mortgages on housing investment. Due to space con-
straints, equilibrium conditions that are not essential for the current discussion are relegated
to Appendix B (this appendix also describes computation).
4.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is defined as follows: (i) the representative household solves its utility
maximization problem, described below, taking all prices and transfers as given; (ii) rt and wt
are equal to their marginal products; (iii) the government budget constraint is satisfied; and
(iv) the exogenous variables follow the VAR(n) process. The aggregate resource constraint,
cMt + xMt + xHt = yt, then holds by Walras’ Law. To characterize the equilibrium, it is
convenient to work with a recursive formulation of the household’s problem
V (s1t, ..., sJ−1,t, kMt, kHt, dt, δDt, Rt) = max{u (ct, 1− hMt − hHt)
+βEtV (s1,t+1, ..., sJ−1,t+1, kM,t+1, kH,t+1, dt+1, δD,t+1, Rt+1)},
subject to (2) and (4)-(13). After substituting the constraints into the Bellman equation,
the maximization is only with respect to hMt, hHt, sJt, and xHt. Here, xHt affects the
period utility function u through its effect on the budget constraint and the value function
V through its effect on the laws of motion for kH,t+1, dt+1, δD,t+1, and Rt+1.
There is enough separability in this problem that the variables related to mortgage finance
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(dt, δDt, Rt; it, pit) show up only in the first-order condition for xHt, which is
u1tc1t(1− θ)− θβEt
[
V˜d,t+1 + ζDt(κ− δαDt)VδD,t+1 + ζDt(it −Rt)VR,t+1
]
= βEtVkH,t+1. (14)
Here, ζDt ≡
(
1−δDt
1+pit
d˜t
)
/
(
1−δDt
1+pit
d˜t + θxHt
)2
, V˜d,t+1 ≡ ptVd,t+1, d˜t ≡ dt/pt−1 and VkH,t, Vdt,
VδD,t, and VRt are the derivatives of the value function with respect to the state variables
specified in the subscript.22 The above redefinitions of Vd,t+1 and dt are made in order to
ensure that the optimization problem is well-defined in the presence of a nonzero steady-state
inflation rate. It is instructive to rearrange the first-order condition (14) as
u1tc1t(1 + τHt) = βEtVkH,t+1, (15)
where VkH,t+1 is decreasing in kH,t+1 (see Appendix B) and
τHt = −θ
{
1 +
βEtV˜d,t+1
u1tc1t
+
ζDt(κ− δαDt)βEtVδD,t+1
u1tc1t
+
ζDt(it −Rt)βEtVR,t+1
u1tc1t
}
(16)
is an endogenous time-varying wedge, further discussed below. For τHt = 0, equation (15)
has a straightforward interpretation: it equates this period’s marginal utility of market con-
sumption with expected marginal lifetime utility of housing from next period on. The wedge
acts like an ad-valorem tax, making an additional unit of housing more or less expensive
in terms of current market consumption. Alternatively, it resembles a housing ‘taste shock’
(e.g., Liu et al., 2013), affecting the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
housing. If θ = 0 (i.e., no mortgage finance), the wedge is equal to zero and the equilibrium
is the same as in GKR; the same results if the finance constraint is specified with inequality
and is slack. Thus, under θ = 0, the model exhibits the same dynamics as the GKR model.
The quantitative question is if for θ ∈ (0, 1) calibrated to the data, and given the estimated
VAR(n) process, the wedge moves in such a way as to overturn the standard result and
22We also adopt the convention of denoting, for example, by u2t the first derivative of the u function with
respect to its second argument.
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reproduce the observed lead-lag patterns of xHt and xMt in relation to yt.
4.2 Nominal interest rates and the wedge
The derivatives of the value function appearing in equation (16) are given by Benveniste-
Scheinkman conditions. Only V˜dt is essential for the current discussion. It is given by
V˜dt = −u1tc1t
(
Rt + δDt
1 + pit
)
+β
(
1− δDt
1 + pit
)
Et
[
V˜d,t+1 + ζxt(δ
α
Dt − κ)VδD,t+1 + ζxt(Rt − it)VR,t+1
]
,
(17)
where ζxt ≡ θxHt/
(
1−δDt
1+pit
d˜t + θxHt
)2
.
An insight into the interpretation of the wedge is gained by again considering a once-and-
for-all house purchase with no outstanding debt (i.e., d˜t = 0 and xH,t+j = 0, for j = 1, 2, ...).
In this case, the terms in equations (16) and (17) capturing the marginal effect of xHt on the
effective interest and amortization rates of the outstanding stock of debt disappear (ζDt = 0
in equation (16) and ζx,t+j = 0, for j = 1, 2, ..., in equation (17), shifted one period forward).
Further, the laws of motion (11)-(13) simplify as in Section 3.2.1. The wedge (16) becomes
τHt = −θ
[
1 + βEt
(
V˜d,t+1
u1tc1t
)]
(18)
and equation (17), shifted one period forward, simplifies to
V˜dt+1 = −u1,t+1c1,t+1
(
it + δD,t+1
1 + pit+1
)
+ β
(
1− δD,t+1
1 + pit+1
)
Et+1V˜d,t+2, (19)
where it is either a FRM rate, an thus constant through out the life of the loan, or an ARM
rate, and thus time-varying. By forward substitution, equation (19) states that the marginal
value of new mortgage debt is given as the expected discounted sum of marginal per-period
real mortgage installments, weighted by the marginal utility of market consumption, over
the lifetime of the loan. The wedge is thus equal to −θ times the difference (as V˜d,t+1 is
negative) between the ‘out-of-pocket’ cost of financing an additional unit of housing, which
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is one unit of foregone market consumption today, and the mortgage cost of doing so, which
is the present value of expected foregone market consumption in the future. Ceteris paribus,
a decline in the cost of mortgage finance (i.e., a decline in the absolute value of V˜d,t+1), leads
to a decline in the wedge, generating—through equation (15)—an increase in xHt.
Continuing the exposition with the simplified wedge, it is apparent from equations (18)
and (19) that the behavior of the wedge depends on the exogenous stochastic process for
the mortgage and inflation rates, and the endogenous behavior of consumption. Ceteris
paribus, a decline in it reduces the wedge. In the case of FRM, the decline applies to interest
payments in all periods of the loan’s life; in the case of ARM, the expected persistence of
the decline matters: a more persistent decline in it reduces the wedge by more. In contrast,
a ceteris paribus decline in pit+1 increases the wedge; a more persistent decline increases the
wedge by more. But what happens if a lower it is accompanied by a similarly—let us say
one-for-one—lower pit+1? Recall that, over the business cycle, nominal interest rates have
similar cyclical dynamics as inflation rates, both leading negatively and lagging positively
(Table 3). Because δDt is less than one and, at the front end of the loan’s life very small—for
instance, κ, the initial amortization rate, is 0.00162 for a 30-year mortgage—the real value
of mortgage installments at the front end declines. This is because an equal decline in the
interest and inflation rates reduces the numerator in the first expression on the right-hand
side of equation (19) by more than the denominator. The effect of lower inflation gains
strength only in later periods of the loan’s life (if the decline in inflation is persistent) as
its cumulative effect starts to sufficiently increase the real value of the installments. If the
‘front-end effect’ dominates this ‘back-end effect’, the wedge declines.
Notice that if the mortgage was modeled as a one-period loan (i.e., δD,t+1 = 1), equation
(19) would reduce to V˜d,t+1 = −u1,t+1c1,t+1(1 + it)/(1 + pit+1) and a one-for-one declines in
the nominal and inflation rates would cancel each other out, leaving the wedge unaffected;
holding inflation constant, a decline in it reduces the wedge even in this case, but less than in
the case of the mortgage where the decline, if persistent, affects mortgage installments over
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many periods. In this sense, a long-term mortgage loan provides, ceteris paribus, a stronger
propagation mechanism for persistent shocks than a one-period loan.
5 Computational experiments
This section calibrates the model and reports findings from the main experiments. As the
lead-lag patterns of mortgage and inflation rates are roughly similar across countries, the
computational experiments are for a generic parameterization based on U.S. data.
5.1 Calibration
The parameter values are summarized in Table 4. One period in the model corresponds to
one quarter and the functional forms are as in GKR: u(., .) = ω log c+(1−ω) log(1−hM−hH);
c(., .) = cψMc
1−ψ
H ; G(., .) = k
η
Hh
1−η
H ; and F (., .) = k
%
Mh
1−%
M . The parameter AH is normalized
to be equal to one and the value of AMt in a nonstochastic steady state is chosen so that yt
in the nonstochastic steady state is equal to one.
As mentioned above, we abstract from consumer durable goods. In addition, hous-
ing services are modeled explicitly in the home sector. The data equivalent to yt is thus
GDP less expenditures on consumer durable goods and the gross value added of housing.
Nonresidential capital in the model is mapped in the data into the sum of nonresidential
structures and equipment & software. If only nonresidential structures were used as the
data equivalent to kMt, the share of capital income in GDP, %, would be too low, making
the model’s dynamic properties difficult to compare with the literature. As in GKR, J is
set equal to 4 and φj is set equal to 0.25 for all j. The parameter % is set equal to 0.283,
based on measurement from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) obtained
by Gomme, Ravikumar, and Rupert (2011). Their NIPA-based estimate of τw = 0.243 is
also used. The depreciation rates are given as the average ratios of investment to the corre-
sponding capital stocks. This yields δH = 0.0115 and δM = 0.0248. These are a little higher
than the average depreciation rates from BEA Fixed Assets Accounts because the model
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abstracts from long-run population and TFP growth.
The parameter θ is set equal to 0.76, the average loan-to-value ratio for conventional single
family newly-built home mortgages (Federal Housing Finance Agency, Monthly Interest Rate
Survey, Table 10, 1963-2006). The steady-state mortgage rate i is set equal to 9.28% per
annum, the average interest rate for the conventional 30-year FRM, 1971-2007, the dominant
mortgage contract in the U.S. The initial amortization rate κ equals 0.00162 (based on a
30-year mortgage) while α, the parameter governing the evolution of the amortization rate,
is set equal to 0.9946. This choice is guided by an approximation of the constant mortgage
installments of the 30-year FRM (see Appendix B). The steady-state inflation rate is set
equal to 4.54% per annum, the average inflation rate for 1971-2007, which is the same
period as that used to parameterize i. Given these values, the law of motion (12) implies a
(quarterly) steady-state amortization rate of 0.0144, which—as in the data—is higher than
the depreciation rate of residential structures. The law of motion for debt (11) then implies
a steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio of 1.64, which is a little lower than the average ratio (1958-
2006) of home mortgages to GDP, which is 1.71 (for GDP less consumer durable goods and
gross value added of housing).
The discount factor β, the share of consumption in utility ω, the share of market good in
consumption ψ, the share of capital in home production η, and the tax rate on income from
nonresidential capital τr are calibrated jointly. Namely, by matching the average values of
hM , hH , kM/y, kH/y, and the after-tax real rate of return on nonresidential capital, using
the steady-state versions of the first-order conditions for hM , hH , sJ , and xH (see Appendix
B), and the model’s after-tax real rate of return on nonresidential capital, (1− τr)(AMF1 −
δM), evaluated at the steady state. According to the American Time-Use Survey (2003),
individuals aged 16 and over spent on average 25.5% of their available time working in the
market and 24% in home production. We assume that half of home hours correspond to
our notion of hH . The average capital-to-GDP ratios are 4.88 for nonresidential capital and
4.79 for residential capital (in both cases consumer durable goods and gross value added of
25
housing are subtracted from GDP). The average (annual) after-tax real rate of return on
nonresidential capital is measured by Gomme et al. (2011) to be 5.16%. These five targets
yield β = 0.988, ω = 0.47, ψ = 0.69, η = 0.30, and τr = 0.61. As is common in models
with disaggregated capital, the tax rate on capital is higher than the statutory tax rate or
an implicit tax rate calculated from NIPA. The calibration implies that in steady state the
wedge τH is small (τH = −0.0117). This is because the average real rate of return on capital
and the average real mortgage rate are similar.
The parameterization of the exogenous stochastic process is based on point estimates
of a VAR(3) process for TFP, the mortgage rate for a 30-year conventional FRM, and the
inflation rate (see Appendix C for details). By construction, this process generates dynamic
correlations of the mortgage and inflation rates with output similar to those in Table 3.
The economy’s resource constraint ct+xMt+xHt = yt implies constant marginal rates of
transformation between the three uses of output, which makes the two types of invest-
ment extremely sensitive to the VAR shocks. To address this issue, we adopt the no-
tion of intratemporal adjustment costs of Huffman and Wynne (1999) and make the pro-
duction possibilities frontier (PPF) concave. Specifically, ct + xMt + qtxHt = yt, where
qt = exp(σ(xtH − xH)), with σ > 0 and xH being the steady-state residential investment.23
The concavity of PPF is a stand-in for the costs of changing the composition of the econ-
omy’s production (Huffman and Wynne, 1999), as well as for the constraints on housing
construction due to available residential land (Davis and Heathcote, 2007). The curvature
parameter σ is chosen by matching the ratio of the standard deviations (for HP-filtered data)
of residential investment (single family structures) and GDP. This yields σ = 6.4. The per-
centage deviation of qt from steady state, which is equal to one, is related to the percentage
deviation of xHt from steady state, equal to 0.055, as q̂t = (xHσ)x̂Ht. If we interpret qt as
the relative price of newly constructed homes, its volatility in the model is comparable to
that in the data. In both cases the standard deviation, for HP-filtered logged data, is about
23Of course, with this modification, xHt is pre-multiplied by qt through out the model. The household
takes qt as given; i.e., qt is the relative price of new housing that depends on the aggregate xHt.
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3 (the data counterpart used is the average sales prices of new homes sold, 1975-2007, from
the Department of Commerce). In addition, in both the model and the data, the contem-
poraneous correlation with output is around 0.5. However, due to the absence of housing
supply shocks, the model overstates the correlation between qt and xHt.
5.2 Findings for one-period residential time to build
Table 5 reports the cyclical behavior of the model economy. Specifically, it contains the
standard deviations (relative to that of yt) of the key endogenous variables and their cross-
correlations with yt at various leads and lags. The upper panel shows the results for the
baseline case of one-period residential time to build. The first thing to notice is that, despite
the introduction of mortgages, the basic variables, yt, hMt, cMt, and xt behave pretty much
like in other business cycle models: market hours are roughly 60% as volatile as output,
market consumption is roughly 50% as volatile as output, and total investment is about four
and a half times as volatile as output. In addition, all three variables are strongly positively
correlated with output contemporaneously, without any leads or lags. The behavior of total
investment is thus broadly in line with the international evidence on GFCF in Figure 1.
Second, residential investment leads output. It is also more volatile than nonresidential
investment. In addition, although not strictly lagging, nonresidential investment is substan-
tially more positively correlated with past output than future output. The reason behind
the lead in residential investment can be understood from the cyclical behavior of the wedge,
which leads negatively. Referring back to our discussion in Section 4.2 and Table 3, the dom-
inating factor behind the movements of the wedge is the nominal mortgage rate. Its negative
correlation with future output transmits into a similarly negative correlation between the
wedge and future output and thus a positive correlation between residential investment and
future output.24
24As new mortgage lending (in real terms) is a constant fraction θ of residential investment, it leads output
exactly as residential investment. This is consistent with the empirical findings in Table 2.
27
5.3 Extension to multi-period residential time to build
When residential construction takes more than one period, a distinction needs to be made
between finished houses and ongoing residential projects. With some small modifications,
residential time to build is modeled in the same way as nonresidential time to build. The
household makes an out-of-pocket investment in residential projects and, upon completion,
it sells the finished houses at a price q∗t . The household also buys finished houses for its
own use (think of the household as a homebuilder who likes houses of other makes than
its own). Let n∗t denote the number of newly constructed houses, occupiable next period,
the household wants to purchase for its own use and let n1t denote the number of houses,
occupiable next period, built by the household. With these modifications, the household’s
budget constraint becomes
cMt+xMt+qtxHt+q
∗
t n
∗
t = (1−τr)rtkMt+τrδMkMt+(1−τw)wthMt+q∗t n1t+ lt/pt−mt/pt+τt,
where lt = θptq
∗
t n
∗
t and xHt =
∑N
ι=1 µιnιt, with nιt denoting residential projects ι periods
from completion (
∑N
ι=1 µι = 1). The stock of houses for the household’s own use evolves as
kH,t+1 = (1− δH)kHt + n∗t
and the on-going residential projects evolve as
nι−1,t+1 = nιt, for ι = 2, ..., N.
In equilibrium, n∗t = n1t. The economy’s resource constraint is the same as before, cMt +
xMt + qtxHt = yt, except that
xHt =
N∑
ι=1
µιnιt,
with n1t, ..., nN−1,t being a part of the vector of state variables. Section 2.3 suggests that
residential time to build in the countries in the sample other than the U.S. and Canada may
28
be as long as one year. N is therefore set equal to 4. In the absence of information on the
distribution of the value put in place over the construction period, the µ’s are assumed to be
the same as the φ’s in nonresidential time to build, µι = 0.25 ∀ι. This parameterization has
the additional advantage of treating the two types of time to build symmetrically. Shifting
the weights towards the first period makes residential investment behave more like starts
while shifting the weights towards the last period makes residential investment look more
like completions. The findings in Table 1 suggest that evenly distributed or backloaded µ’s
are the most plausible.
The lower panel of Table 5 reports the results. In addition to the variables reported in
the case of one-period time to build, the table also reports results for ‘housing starts’ n4t
(i.e., structures four periods from completion) and ‘completions’ n0t (i.e., structures that in
period t have become a part of the usable housing stock ht). As the table shows, xHt now
reaches the highest correlation at j = 0, while starts lead by two quarters and completions
lag by two quarters. The cyclical properties of the basic aggregates yt, hMt, cMt and xt are
left, more or less, unaffected.
5.4 Discussion: refinancing
A simplifying feature of the mortgage in the model is the absence of the option to refinance.
Refinancing complicates modeling of mortgages as, being an option, introduces a kink in
the payoffs from the contract. An informal argument, however, can be made that, at least
for our question, abstracting from refinancing is reasonable. First, consider the case of no
refinancing. Suppose that the FRM rate temporarily declines ahead of an increase in output
and is expected to mean revert. This is the standard situation in the model and, according
to the model, households take out mortgages when the rate is low. Now suppose that
households can refinance. Of course, they will not exercise the option along the increasing
path of the FRM rate. Thus, in this case, the presence of refinancing does not affect the
timing of when to take out a mortgage. Suppose, instead, that the FRM rate temporarily
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increases and is expected to mean revert. In the absence of refinancing, the households in the
model reduce demand for mortgages until the mortgage rate has sufficiently declined (waiting
means trading off lower mortgage costs for foregone utility of housing). Now suppose that
households can refinance and that they can do so at zero cost. Then they refinance every
period along the declining path of the interest rate. In this case, a FRM is akin to an ARM
in the sense that the nominal mortgage installments change every period due to changes in
the interest rate. As the next section shows, under ARM households in the model also reduce
demand for mortgages when the interest rate is temporarily high and is expected to mean
revert. Thus, again, the presence of refinancing should not, at least qualitatively, affect the
timing of housing investment over the business cycle.
6 The quantitative importance of mortgages
In order to further investigate the quantitative role of mortgages, Table 6 reports the dynamic
properties of the investment variables, and the wedge, for various specifications of the model
(the version with one-period residential time to build).
We start by removing mortgage finance from the model (θ = 0). The exogenous VAR
process, however, stays the same. This guarantees that the underlying probability space
of the economy remains unchanged; the VAR is kept the same across experiments (a)-(d).
With θ = 0, the mortgage and inflation rates matter to the extent that they help forecast
future TFP. Specifically, referring back to the dynamics of these variables in Table 3, a
low mortgage or inflation rate forecasts high TFP. Thus the two nominal variables work as
‘news shocks’. As panel (a) of Table 6 shows, with θ = 0, the lead-lag patterns observed
in the baseline economy disappear: both xHt and xMt are now coincident with output, with
very strong contemporaneous correlations; in addition, xHt is substantially less volatile than
xMt. Whereas the behavior of its components changes, the behavior of total investment,
xt, remains broadly unaffected by removing mortgage finance. In fact, the dynamics of xt
stay, more or less, unchanged across all model specifications in the table. This is because
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consumption smoothing constrains the response of total investment to shocks. For this
reason, xHt and xMt can both be coincident with output, as in the current case, only if at
least one of the two becomes substantially less volatile than in the baseline. A corollary of this
result is that xMt has to lag output when xHt leads output with sufficiently high volatility.
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The results of the current experiment also mean that, by themselves, expectations of higher
future TFP (positive ‘news shocks’ to TFP), and thus of higher future income, are not
sufficient to produce residential investment leading output.
Next, consider again the case of no mortgage finance (θ = 0) and also assume a linear
production possibilities frontier (σ = 0). This makes changes in the output mix less costly
than in the previous case and the baseline. This economy is essentially the GKR economy
(subject to small differences in calibration and the presence of the VAR process). In this
case, as panel (b) shows, both xHt and xMt become more volatile than in the previous case
and the ‘inverted’ lead-lag pattern present in most existing models re-appears. As GKR
show, this inverted lead-lag pattern would be even more pronounced if there was no time to
build in nonresidential capital.
As noted above, typical loan-to-value ratios for new mortgage loans are similar across
the countries in the sample. However, Belgium and France have only about half as high
mortgage debt-to-GDP ratios than Australia, the U.K., and the U.S., with Canada being
somewhere in-between (International Monetary Fund, 2011). Partly, this reflects limited
access to second mortgages and home equity loans (Calza et al., 2013), which our model
abstracts from, but partly it also reflects historically smaller fraction of new homes financed
through mortgages. Setting θ equal to 0.36 yields steady-state debt-to-output ratio about
half as high as in the baseline. According to equations (16) and (18), with a lower θ, the
wedge responds less to changes in the cost of mortgage finance. Panel (c) shows that in this
case the volatility of xHt declines below that in the baseline, and below that of xMt. The
cross-correlations with output, however, still exhibit a lead, though a little less pronounced
25Arguably, this consumption smoothing constraint would be weaker if the model economy was an open
economy.
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than in the baseline.
Panel (d) considers the case of a one-period loan (δDt = 1 ∀t), which results when α = 0
and κ = 1. As should be expected from the discussion in Section 4.2, the wedge is now little
volatile (and broadly uncorrelated with output), resulting in the behavior of the investment
variables similar to those under θ = 0, panel (a).26
Panel (e) investigates the role of the interest and inflation rate dynamics. Specifically, it
considers the extreme case in which it and pit are held constant at their steady-state values.
The estimated VAR process is replaced with an AR(1) process for TFP, with persistence
0.94 and standard deviation of the innovation equal to 0.008 (i.e., households understand
that it and pit are constant). Under this specification the model behaves as if θ was equal to
zero. Taking the results of experiments (d) and (e) together, both mortgages and the cyclical
dynamics of mortgage and inflation rates play a role in the cyclical dynamics of residential
and nonresidential investment. A corollary of the result of experiment (e) is then that the
time series properties of the two investment variables observed in the data are subject to a
structural break when the dynamics of the two nominal variables (especially of the nominal
interest rate) change.
Finally, a FRM is compared with an ARM. Under an ARM, the mortgage rate in the
model is reset every period (a quarter). A natural choice for an ARM rate is therefore the
yield on 3-month T-bills (the VAR process is re-estimated using this interest rate and is
reported in Appendix C). Panel (f) shows that in this case a positive correlation of xHt with
output occurs only at leads of two or more quarters. The highest positive correlation (0.42)
occurs at j = −5, which falls outside of the table, and the contemporaneous correlation is
negative. This long lead and the negative contemporaneous correlation are due to the wedge
starting to increase well ahead of a peak in output—its correlation with output starts to
become positive already at j = −2; compare this with the correlations of the FRM wedge in
Table 5. The behavior of the wedge reflects the anticipated future increases in the 3-month
26The same result is also obtained if, instead of the FRM interest rate, the VAR process includes a 3-month
T-Bill rate, which is more appropriate for a one-period loan.
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T-bill rate, and thus higher future real mortgage installments. In contrast, in the case of
FRM, the low interest rate that occurs ahead of an output peak stays the same through out
the life of the mortgage taken out at that time.27
Bucks and Pence (2008) compare survey evidence on the perceived adjustability of ARM
rates by households to administrative data on ARM terms and show that households system-
atically underestimate the extent to which their ARM rates can rise as short-term interest
rates increase. To the extent that this is the case, the model—in which households under-
stand the stochastic process for the short rate—overstates, relative to the actual economy,
the responses of the wedge to expected future rises in interest rates. Panel (g) carries out
the same exercise as panel (f), but using the initial interest rate charged on ARMs, instead
of the 3-month T-bill rate. This is the interest rate that most ARMs carry for a specified
initial period before interest payments become tied to an index, such as a T-bill rate. In
the data, the initial ARM rate tends to stay low for longer than the 3-month T-bill rate
and increases less sharply over the business cycle. Panel (g) of Table 6 shows that in this
case the wedge stays low a little longer than in panel (f) and its increase is less pronounced.
This results in xHt leading output by three quarters, instead of five, with a modest positive
contemporaneous correlation.
7 Concluding remarks
In a sample of developed economies, residential construction, measured by housing starts,
leads real GDP. When measured by residential investment in national accounts, the lead is
observed in the U.S. and Canada; in other countries in the sample, residential investment is
more or less coincident with GDP. Such cyclical properties are at odds with the predictions of
existing business cycle models that disaggregate capital into residential and nonresidential.
Motivated by a striking similarity, across countries, of the cyclical properties of nominal
27Koijen et al. (2009) argue that the changes in the relative cost of FRM v.s. ARM are mainly driven
by cyclical variations in term premia. Such variations are here implicitly reflected in the VAR processes for
FRM and ARM.
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mortgage interest rates, and the dependence of house purchases on mortgage finance, we
introduce mortgages into an otherwise standard business cycle model with home and market
sectors. Feeding into the model the observed cyclical dynamics of nominal mortgage interest
rates and inflation rates produces dynamics of residential and nonresidential investment
similar to those in the U.S. and Canada. Of the two nominal variables, the nominal interest
rate is the dominant factor. Increasing time to build in residential construction then makes
residential investment coincident with GDP as in most other countries in the sample. Housing
starts, however, still lead output as in the data. The results come at no cost in terms of
deteriorating the model’s ability to account for standard business cycle moments as much as
other models in the literature.
Due to the absence of off-the-shelf theory for the cyclical lead-lag pattern of mortgage
rates, and nominal interest rates more generally, the stochastic process for mortgage rates is
taken as exogenous. However, by itself, the process is not sufficient to reproduce the lead in
housing starts and residential investment observed in the data. The other necessary element
is the long-term fully-amortizing nature of standard mortgage loans; one-period loans are
not sufficient to generate the observed dynamics of the housing variables. The model also
predicts that the cyclical lead in residential construction is not structural in nature: once the
cyclical dynamics of nominal interest rates and inflation change, the empirical regularities
of residential investment change as well.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to answer the question what drives the observed
movements of mortgage rates. We have documented that their cyclical behavior is similar to
that of government bond yields of comparable maturities but leave open for future research
the issue of the lead-lag pattern and causality between government bond yields and TFP or
output.
While the main aim of the paper was to enhance our understanding of the lead-lag
dynamics of residential and nonresidential investment, a broader lesson of the analysis is
that nominal interest rates, in conjunction with long-term mortgage loans, may have a
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quantitatively significant effect on the economy. In our framework this shows up only in
the composition of total investment, not in other aggregate variables. It is, however, worth
exploring channels through which such effects could transmit into the broader economy.
This, of course, requires a richer framework than the one used here. Our way of modeling
mortgages, however, should make it relatively easy to introduce long-term mortgage loans
into a variety of DSGE models more suitable for addressing such questions. Extensions along
these lines may provide an additional channel of the transmission of monetary policy above
and beyond the standard channels present in these models.
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Figure 1: Cyclical dynamics of total fixed investment (gross fixed capital formation).
The plots are correlations of real investment in t + j with real GDP in t; the data
are logged and filtered with Hodrick-Prescott filter. The volatility of total fixed
investment (measured by its standard deviation relative to that of real GDP) is:
AUS = 3.98, BEL = 3.93, CAN = 3.32, FRA = 2.65, UK = 2.55, US = 3.23.
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Figure 2: Cyclical dynamics of residential and nonresidential investment. The plots
are correlations of real investment in t + j with real GDP in t; the data are logged
and filtered with Hodrick-Prescott filter. The volatility of residential (nonresidential)
investment, relative to that of real GDP, is: AUS = 5.95 (6.96), BEL = 7.97 (4.36),
CAN = 4.39 (3.97), FRA = 3.05 (3.24), UK = 5.02 (3.24), US = 6.42 (3.40).
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Figure 3: Statistical significance of leads and lags in investment dynamics. His-
tograms show the frequency with which a given j has the highest correlation coeffi-
cient in a sample of 10,000 cross-correlograms based on bootstrapped data.
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Figure 4: Housing starts. The top six charts plot cross-correlations in the historical
data (logged and HP-filtered); the bottom six charts show the statistical significance
of leads and lags in the data; i.e., the frequency with which a given j has the
highest correlation coefficient in a sample of 10,000 cross-correlograms based on
bootstrapped data. The volatility of housing starts in the historical data, relative
to that of real GDP, is: AUS = 8.80, BEL = 11.67, CAN = 9.95, FRA = 6.24, UK
= 9.81, US = 9.72.
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Table 1: Starts, completions, and residential investmenta
Relative Correlations of real GDP in t with a variable in t+ j:
std. dev.b j = -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
United States
Starts
1 unit 8.85 0.65 0.70 0.68 0.56 0.33 0.05 -0.18 -0.35 -0.42
5+ units 14.54 0.40 0.50 0.55 0.53 0.43 0.27 0.09 -0.06 -0.17
Completions
1 unit 7.17 0.64 0.74 0.79 0.76 0.72 0.53 0.29 0.07 -0.12
5+ units 10.56 0.09 0.19 0.31 0.43 0.53 0.62 0.64 0.57 0.48
Resid. invest.
Single family 8.77 0.62 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.60 0.35 0.08 -0.17 -0.33
Multifamily 11.22 0.16 0.28 0.39 0.47 0.49 0.43 0.32 0.19 0.07
Australia
Starts 8.80 0.31 0.44 0.48 0.45 0.36 0.16 -0.08 -0.27 -0.40
Completions 6.87 0.06 0.18 0.30 0.42 0.50 0.47 0.33 0.14 -0.05
Resid. invest. 5.95 0.11 0.26 0.41 0.55 0.57 0.48 0.29 0.11 -0.08
United Kingdom
Starts 9.81 0.61 0.68 0.69 0.61 0.42 0.16 -0.11 -0.35 -0.53
Completions 4.62 -0.07 0.10 0.29 0.46 0.55 0.59 0.56 0.49 0.37
Resid. invest. 5.02 0.38 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.32 0.20 0.05
a The series are logged and filtered with Hodrick-Prescott filter.
b Standard deviations are expressed relative to that of a country’s real GDP.
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Table 2: Single family residential investment in the U.S.—further detailsa
Relative Correlations of real GDP in t with a variable in t+ j:
std. dev.b j = -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
The effect of Regulation Q
Resid. invest.
1959.Q1–1983.Q4 8.84 0.58 0.65 0.73 0.72 0.62 0.39 0.14 -0.11 -0.30
1984.Q1–2006.Q4 8.40 0.51 0.57 0.60 0.57 0.48 0.28 0.05 -0.13 -0.25
Mortgage lending and investmentc
Home mortgagesd 15.01 0.47 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.42 0.23 0.10 -0.08 -0.19
Resid. invest. 8.77 0.62 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.60 0.35 0.08 -0.17 -0.33
a The series are logged and filtered with Hodrick-Prescott filter.
b Standard deviations are expressed relative to that of a country’s real GDP.
c Both for 1959.Q1–2006.Q4
d Net change in home mortgages, deflated with GDP deflator (home mortgages = 1-4 family properties).
The fraction of new construction accounted for by 2-4 family structures is small making home mortgages a
good proxy for single family housing mortgages, for which data are not available.
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Table 3: Cyclical dynamics of nominal mortgage interest ratesa
Relative Correlations of real GDP in t with a variable in t+ j:
std. dev.b j = -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Mortgage ratesc
AUS ARM 0.59 -0.29 -0.22 -0.16 -0.03 0.12 0.25 0.39 0.48 0.50
BEL FRM 10 yrs 0.89 -0.17 0.01 0.19 0.38 0.56 0.63 0.60 0.53 0.41
CAN FRM 5 yrs 0.77 -0.52 -0.41 -0.24 -0.04 0.19 0.38 0.45 0.45 0.43
FRA FRM 15 yrs 0.87 -0.10 -0.02 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.36 0.35 0.31 0.27
UK ARMd 1.29 -0.68 -0.52 -0.31 -0.06 0.17 0.36 0.49 0.55 0.56
US FRM 30 yrs 0.55 -0.59 -0.55 -0.46 -0.29 -0.07 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.23
Government bond yieldse
AUS 3-m 1.07 -0.19 -0.06 0.10 0.24 0.34 0.44 0.52 0.45 0.34
BEL 10-yr 0.75 -0.01 0.20 0.33 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.31 0.19
CAN 3-5-yr 0.73 -0.42 -0.25 -0.06 0.17 0.39 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.41
FRA 10-yr 0.86 -0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.21 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.24
UK 3-m 1.29 -0.68 -0.52 -0.31 -0.06 0.17 0.36 0.49 0.55 0.56
US 10-yr 0.53 -0.45 -0.39 -0.29 -0.11 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.09
3-m 0.88 -0.45 -0.30 -0.10 0.17 0.39 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.46
Inflation ratesf
AUS 1.60 -0.31 -0.19 0.01 0.24 0.43 0.54 0.56 0.51 0.42
BEL 0.76 -0.03 -0.13 -0.23 -0.25 -0.17 0.02 0.22 0.39 0.44
CAN 1.10 -0.29 -0.12 0.06 0.23 0.37 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.51
FRA 1.08 -0.34 -0.25 -0.15 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.11 0.24
UK 2.16 -0.68 -0.61 -0.45 -0.24 0.01 0.20 0.36 0.45 0.51
US 1.24 -0.27 -0.12 0.02 0.21 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.51
a GDP is in logs; all series are filtered with Hodrick-Prescott filter; time periods differ across countries
due to different availability of mortgage rate data: AUS (59.Q3-06.Q4), BEL (80.Q1-06.Q4), CAN
(61.Q1-06.Q4), FRA (78.Q1-06.Q4), UK (65.Q1-06.Q4), US (71.Q2-06.Q4).
b Standard deviations are expressed relative to that of a country’s real GDP.
c Based on a typical mortgage for each country, as reported by Calza et al. (2013) and
Scanlon and Whitehead (2004). Mortgages rates are APR. ARM = adjustable rate mortgage (in-
terest rate can be reset within one year), FRM = fixed rate mortgage (interest rate can be at the
earliest reset only after 5 years). The numbers accompanying FRMs refer to the number of years for
which the mortgage rate is typically fixed.
d U.K. mortgage rate data are available only from 1995.Q1. 3-m T-bill rate is used as a proxy for the
adjustable mortgage rate for the period 1965.Q1-1994.Q4; the correlation between the two interest
rates for the period 1995.Q1-2006.Q4 is 0.97.
e Constant maturity rates; APR; periods correspond to those of mortgage rates.
f Consumer price indexes; q-on-q percentage change at annual rate; periods correspond to those of
mortgage rates.
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Table 4: Calibration
Symbol Value Definition
Preferences
β 0.988 Discount factor
ω 0.472 Consumption share in utility
ψ 0.692 Share of market good
in consumption
Home technology
δH 0.0115 Depreciation rate
η 0.305 Capital share in production
Nonresidential time to build
J 4 Number of periods
φj 0.25 Fraction completed at stage j
Market technology
δM 0.0248 Depreciation rate
% 0.283 Capital share in production
σ 6.4 PPF curvature parameter
Tax rates
τw 0.243 Tax rate on labor income
τr 0.612 Tax rate on capital income
Mortgages
θ 0.76 Loan-to-value ratio
κ 0.00162 Initial amortization rate
α 0.9946 Adjustment factor
i 0.0232 Steady-state mortgage rate
pi 0.0113 Steady-state inflation rate
Note: The parameters of the exogenous stochastic process are contained
in Appendix C.
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Table 5: Cyclical behavior of the model economya
Rel. Correlations of y in period t with variable υ in period t+ j:
υt+j st.dev.
b j = -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
1-period residential time to build
Main aggregates
y 1.01 -0.03 0.19 0.48 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.48 0.19 -0.03
hM 0.56 0.10 0.31 0.57 0.76 0.89 0.68 0.41 0.07 -0.21
cM 0.48 -0.21 -0.09 0.13 0.38 0.70 0.52 0.38 0.29 0.28
x 4.42 0.07 0.29 0.56 0.78 0.93 0.71 0.43 0.10 -0.18
Investment components and the wedge
xH 8.45 0.19 0.34 0.50 0.55 0.51 0.31 0.11 -0.13 -0.32
xM 4.33 -0.12 0.03 0.25 0.50 0.78 0.70 0.52 0.31 0.12
τH 3.26 -0.21 -0.33 -0.43 -0.43 -0.32 -0.17 -0.02 0.18 0.34
4-period residential time to build
Main aggregates
y 1.01 -0.03 0.17 0.45 0.73 1.00 0.73 0.45 0.17 -0.03
hM 0.54 0.11 0.30 0.55 0.76 0.92 0.66 0.37 0.05 -0.21
cM 0.44 -0.23 -0.10 0.14 0.41 0.76 0.58 0.43 0.31 0.29
x 4.32 0.08 0.28 0.54 0.77 0.95 0.69 0.40 0.08 -0.17
Investment components, starts, completions, and the wedgec
xH 6.51 0.18 0.32 0.47 0.57 0.60 0.42 0.14 -0.16 -0.40
n4 8.89 0.33 0.40 0.50 0.48 0.38 -0.10 -0.33 -0.40 -0.34
n0 8.88 -0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.18 0.33 0.40 0.50 0.48 0.38
xM 4.11 -0.13 0.05 0.31 0.60 0.90 0.80 0.62 0.38 0.14
τH 3.17 -0.22 -0.34 -0.43 -0.42 -0.29 -0.16 -0.02 0.18 0.34
a Calibration is as in Table 4. The statistics are averages for 200 artificial data samples.
All variables are in percentage deviations from steady state, except the wedge, which
is in percentage point deviations from steady state. Before computing the statistics for
each sample, the artificial data were filtered with the HP filter.
b Standard deviations are measured relative to that of y; the standard deviation of y is
in absolute terms.
c n4 = housing starts (houses that in period t are four periods from completion), n0 =
housing completions (houses that in period t− 1 were one period away from completion
and in period t have become a part of the housing stock).
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Table 6: Impact of mortgage finance variables on investment dynamics
Rel. Correlations of y in period t with variable υ in period t+ j:
υt+j st.dev. j = -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
(a) No mortgage finance (θ = 0); it and pit are ‘news shocks’
x 4.21 0.08 0.27 0.52 0.76 0.98 0.75 0.46 0.15 -0.10
xH 0.78 -0.07 0.06 0.30 0.55 0.84 0.55 0.37 0.28 0.34
xM 5.79 0.09 0.28 0.52 0.76 0.97 0.74 0.46 0.14 -0.14
τH – – – – – – – – – –
(b) Same as (a) plus a linear PPF (σ = 0)
x 4.77 0.14 0.29 0.50 0.72 0.99 0.69 0.43 0.19 0.04
xH 14.66 -0.19 -0.08 0.02 0.20 0.54 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.50
xM 6.32 0.36 0.41 0.54 0.59 0.52 0.22 -0.07 -0.29 -0.48
τH – – – – – – – – – –
(c) Low mortgage finance (θ = 0.36)
x 4.28 0.06 0.26 0.52 0.76 0.97 0.73 0.45 0.13 -0.14
xH 3.34 0.17 0.31 0.47 0.55 0.53 0.30 0.09 -0.15 -0.31
xM 5.13 0.00 0.19 0.45 0.71 0.96 0.77 0.51 0.21 -0.05
τH 1.26 -0.21 -0.30 -0.37 -0.34 -0.21 -0.08 0.06 0.24 0.39
(d) 1-period loan (δDt = 1 ∀t)
x 4.30 0.07 0.27 0.52 0.76 0.98 0.75 0.47 0.17 -0.11
xH 0.83 -0.08 0.10 0.35 0.63 0.86 0.66 0.45 0.43 0.17
xM 5.85 0.08 0.28 0.52 0.76 0.97 0.74 0.46 0.14 -0.13
τH 0.21 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 -0.04 -0.15 -0.09 -0.22 0.23
(e) Constant it and pit (held at steady-state values)
x 3.49 0.16 0.30 0.49 0.71 0.98 0.69 0.44 0.20 -0.02
xH 0.72 0.09 0.24 0.44 0.68 0.99 0.69 0.45 0.28 0.17
xM 4.65 0.16 0.31 0.49 0.71 0.97 0.69 0.43 0.19 -0.04
τH 0.19 -0.05 0.07 0.24 0.47 0.79 0.49 0.33 0.31 0.45
(f) ARM (using 3m T-Bill rate)
x 4.26 0.13 0.19 0.43 0.68 0.95 0.73 0.44 0.16 0.03
xH 2.55 0.37 0.28 0.10 -0.13 -0.39 -0.54 -0.61 -0.61 -0.55
xM 7.07 0.03 0.11 0.36 0.63 0.93 0.76 0.52 0.28 0.15
τH 1.11 -0.24 -0.17 0.07 0.34 0.69 0.65 0.65 0.59 0.58
(g) ARM (using the ARM rate)
x 4.15 0.15 0.34 0.57 0.78 0.97 0.77 0.52 0.23 -0.03
xH 1.52 0.34 0.42 0.39 0.26 0.10 -0.11 -0.26 -0.34 -0.37
xM 5.99 0.10 0.28 0.52 0.75 0.97 0.80 0.57 0.29 0.03
τH 0.74 -0.27 -0.22 -0.08 0.15 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.45
Note: For the experiments in panels (a)-(d), the underlying probability space is the
same as in the baseline experiments in Table 5; i.e., given by the same VAR process
as in the baseline model. Thus, in cases (a) and (b), it and pit still play a forecasting
role, even though θ = 0. For the experiment in panel (e), the process is changed
to an AR(1) process for market TFP only, with a persistence parameter 0.94 and
standard deviation of the innovation 0.008. For experiments in panels (f) and (g),
a VAR process with the short-term interest rate noted in the brackets is used.
49
Appendix (for online publication only)
A. International data used in Section 2
Australia. Real volumes: GDP, private GFCF, private GFCF nondwelling construc-
tion total, private GFCF dwellings total (all in chained dollars, SA, 1959.Q3-2006.Q4, Aus-
tralian Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts);Mortgage rate: standard variable hous-
ing loans lending rate, banks (1959.Q3-2006.Q4, Reserve Bank of Australia); Interest
rate: 3-month T-bill yield (1960.Q1-2006.Q4, Global Financial Data); Inflation rate:
CPI q-on-q percentage change at annual rate (SA adjusted by authors, 1959.Q3-2006.Q4,
OECD-MEI ); Housing starts: units, SA, 1965.Q3-2006.Q4,OECD-MEI ; Housing com-
pletions: units, SA, 1965.Q3-2006.Q4,Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Belgium. Real volumes: GDP at market prices, GFCF total, GFCF in dwellings, GFCF
by enterprises, self-employed workers and non-profit institutions (all in chained 2006 euros,
SA, 1980.Q1-2006.Q4, BelgoStat Online, National Accounts); Mortgage rate: fixed rate
on loans for house purchasing (1980.Q1-2006.Q4, Global Financial Data); Interest rate:
3-month T-bill yield (1980.Q1-2006.Q4, Global Financial Data); Inflation rate: CPI-ex
q-on-q percentage change at annual rate (SA adjusted by authors, 1980.Q1-2006.Q4, OECD-
MEI ); Housing starts: units, SA, 1968.Q1-2006.Q4, OECD-MEI.
Canada. Real volumes: GDP, residential structures, nonresidential structures, single
dwellings, multiple dwellings (all in chained 2002 dollars, SA, Statistics Canada, National
Accounts, 1961.Q1-2006.Q4, except for single and multiple dwellings, which are for 1981.Q1-
2006.Q4); Mortgage rate: conventional mortgage lending rate, 5-year term (1961.Q1-
2006.Q4, Statistics Canada); Interest rate: 3-month T-bill yield (1961.Q1-2006.Q4,
Global Financial Data); Inflation rate: CPI q-on-q percentage change at annual rate
(SA adjusted by authors, 1961.Q1-2006.Q4, OECD-MEI ); Housing starts: units, SA,
1960.Q1-2006.Q4, OECD-MEI.
France. Real volumes: GDP, total GFCF, GFCF of non financial enterprises—including
uninc. entrep., GFCF of households—excluding uninc. entrep. (all in chained euros, SA,
1971.Q1-2006.Q4, INSEE, National Accounts); Mortgage rate: mortgage lending rate
(1978.Q1-2006.Q4, Global Financial Data); Interest rate: money market rate (1971.Q1-
2006.Q4, International Financial Statistics and Datastream); Inflation rate: CPI-ex
q-on-q percentage change at annual rate (SA adjusted by authors, 1978.Q1-2006.Q4, OECD-
MEI ); Housing starts: units, SA, 1974.Q1-2006.Q4, OECD-MEI.
United Kingdom. Real volumes: GDP at market prices, GFCF total, GFCF dwellings,
GFCF other new buildings and structures (all in chained 2002 pounds, SA, 1965.Q1-2006.Q4,
Office for National Statistics, United Kingdom Economic Accounts); Mortgage rate:
sterling standard variable mortgage rate to households (1995.Q1-2006.Q4, Bank of England);
Interest rate: 3-month T-bill yield (1965.Q1-2006.Q4, Office for National Statistics);
Inflation rate: CPI q-on-q percentage change at annual rate (SA adjusted by authors,
1965.Q1-2006.Q4, OECD-MEI ); Housing starts and completions: units, SA adjusted
by authors, 1978.Q1-2006.Q4, Department of Communities and Local Government.
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United States. Real volumes: GDP, private fixed investment, private residential fixed
investment, private fixed investment single family, private fixed investment multifamily, pri-
vate fixed investment structures (all in chained 2000 dollars, SA, 1958.Q1-2006.Q4, FRED
and Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts); Mortgage
rate: 30-year conventional mortgage rate (1971.Q1-2006.Q4, FRED); Interest rate: 3-
month T-bill yield (1958.Q1-2006.Q4, FRED); Inflation rate: CPI q-on-q percentage
change at annual rate (SA, 1971.Q2-2006.Q4, OECD-MEI ); Housing starts: units, SA,
1959.Q1-2006.Q4, FRED ; Housing starts and completions for structure types:
units, SA, 1968.Q1-2006.Q4, Survey of Construction, Census Bureau; Home mortgages:
Millions of current dollars, SAAR, Flow of Funds, Table F217.
Availability of residential and nonresidential investment data for other coun-
tries: Austria from 1988.Q1, Denmark from 1990.Q1, Finland from 1990.Q1, Germany
from 1991.Q1 (annually from 1970), Ireland from 1997.Q1 (annually from 1970), Italy from
1990.Q1, the Netherlands from 1987.Q1, New Zealand from 1987.Q2, (annually from 1972),
Portugal from 1995.Q1, and Spain from 1995.Q1. The data sources are the OECD Main
Economic Indicators database, the OECD National Accounts database, and national statis-
tical agencies. The data are also available for Japan from 1980.Q1, Norway from 1978.Q1,
and Sweden from 1980.Q1. However, for these time periods residential investment in these
countries does not exhibit ‘cyclical’ fluctuations in the sense of recurrent random ups and
downs. Instead, in each of these countries the data are dominated by one episode: the fi-
nancial and housing market crises in Norway (1987-1992) and Sweden (1990s) and the late
1980s/early 1990s housing boom and bust in Japan.
B. Model: further details and computation
B.1 Full set of the household’s optimality conditions
The household’s optimal decisions are characterized by four first-order conditions for hMt,
hHt, sJt, and xHt. These are, respectively,
u1tc1t(1− τw)wt = u2t,
u1tc2tAHG2t = u2t,
u1tc1tφJ = βEtVsJ−1,t+1,
u1tc1t(1− θ)− θβEt
[
V˜d,t+1 + ζDt(κ− δαDt)VδD,t+1 + ζDt(it −Rt)VR,t+1
]
= βEtVkH,t+1.
Here V˜d,t+1 and ζDt are defined as in the main text; that is, V˜d,t+1 ≡ ptVd,t+1 and ζDt ≡(
1−δDt
1+pit
d˜t
)
/
(
1−δDt
1+pit
d˜t + θxHt
)2
, where d˜t ≡ dt/pt−1.
The first-order condition for sJt is accompanied by Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions for
sjt (j = J − 1, ..., 2), s1t, and kMt, respectively,
Vsjt = −u1tc1tφj + βEtVsj−1,t+1, j = J − 1, ..., 2,
Vs1t = −u1tc1tφ1 + βEtVkM ,t+1,
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VkM ,t = u1tc1t [(1− τr)rt + τrδM ] + β(1− δM)EtVkM ,t+1.
The first-order condition for xHt has four Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions, for dt, δDt, Rt,
and kHt. These are, respectively,
V˜dt = −u1tc1tRt + δDt
1 + pit
+ β
1− δDt
1 + pit
Et
[
V˜d,t+1 + ζxt(δ
α
Dt − κ)VδD,t+1 + ζxt(Rt − it)VR,t+1
]
,
VδD,t = −u1tc1t
(
d˜t
1 + pit
)
+
[
ζxt(κ− δαDt) +
(1− δDt)αδα−1Dt
1−δDt
1+pit
d˜t + θxHt
](
d˜t
1 + pit
)
βEtVδD,t+1
−
(
d˜t
1 + pit
)
βEtV˜d,t+1 + ζxt(it −Rt)
(
d˜t
1 + pit
)
βEtVR,t+1,
VRt = −u1tc1t
(
d˜t
1 + pit
)
+
1−δDt
1+pit
d˜t
1−δDt
1+pit
d˜t + θxHt
βEtVR,t+1,
VkH t = u1tc2tAHtG1t + βEtVkH ,t+1(1− δH),
where ζxt is defined as in the main text: ζxt ≡ θxHt/
(
1−δDt
1+pit
d˜t + θxHt
)2
. Notice that the
terms involving V˜d,t+1, VδD,t+1, and VR,t+1 appear only in the first-order condition for xHt, as
claimed in the main text. These terms drop out if θ = 0. In this case the optimal decisions
are characterized by the same conditions as in GKR, implying the same allocations as in
their model.
B.2 A numerical example for the mortgage loan
Here we elaborate further on the discussion in Section 3.2.1 by providing a numerical example
for the evolution of mortgage installments implied by the mortgage in the model in the case
of the once-and-for-all housing investment considered in that section. In particular, Figure
A.1 tracks the main characteristics of the mortgage over its life and compares them with
the characteristics of a standard fully-amortizing mortgage in the real world. Here, one
period corresponds to one quarter, l0 = $250, 000 and i0 = 9.28%/4 (the long-run average
interest rate for a U.S. 30-year conventional FRM, which was used to calibrate the model).
The polynomial governing the evolution of the amortization rate of the mortgage in the
model is δαDt and the parameter values are the same as those used in the computational
experiments in the main text: α = 0.9946 and κ = 0.00162. Panels A and B plot mortgage
installments, mt, and outstanding debt, dt, respectively, for 120 quarters. Panel C then plots
the shares of interest payments, Rtdt, and amortization payments, δDtdt, in the mortgage
installments, mt. For the real-world mortgage, the variables are obtained from the Yahoo
Mortgage Calculator. We see that the mortgage loan in the model captures two key features
of the real-world mortgage. First, mortgage payments are approximately constant in the
model for the first 70 or so periods (17.5 years). Second, interest payments are front-loaded:
they make up most of mortgage installments at the beginning of the life of the mortgage
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and their share gradually declines; the opposite is true for amortization payments. If α was
equal to one, the share of interest payments in mt would be constant and mt would decline
approximately linearly throughout the lifetime of the mortgage. How close are the mortgage
installments in the model to those of the real-world mortgage? By comparing the time
paths in panel A one may conclude that the model approximates the real-world installments
poorly, as after the 70th period the installments in the model significantly deviate from the
installments in the real-world contract. This deviation, however, matters only little for the
housing investment decision in period 0. This is because mortgage installments far out in
the life of the mortgage are heavily discounted (by inflation and the real discount factor)
and thus affect the present value cost of the mortgage—and hence the wedge—only little. A
more suitable metric for comparing the two mortgages is therefore the difference between the
two installment paths in present value (here we use 1/i as the discount factor), normalized
by the size of the loan (i.e., $250, 000). This metric is plotted in panel D of the figure, which
shows that throughout the 120 periods the approximation error is of the order of magnitude
of 1e−4. The sum of the absolute values of these present-value errors is equal to about 3% of
the size of the loan. For comparison, this is about the same as the typical transaction costs
of obtaining a mortgage in the United States.
Figure A.2 shows the same plots as Figure A.1, but for a more complex polynomial
governing the evolution of the amortization rate: (1 − δDt)δα1Dt + δDtδα2Dt, with α1 = 0.9974
and α2 = 0.7463 (κ is the same as before). This specification implies that as δDt increases,
its evolution gets relatively more governed by α2 than by α1. As α2 < α1, this means that
the amortization rate increases at an increasingly faster rate as it gets closer to one. As
the figure shows, this improves the model mortgage by making its installments track more
closely the installments of the real-world mortgage. The approximation errors are plotted
in panel D and (in absolute values) add up to less than one percent. For the results in the
paper, however, this improvement makes little difference.
Finally, Figure A.3 plots the same variables as Figure A.2 (with the addition of the
amortization rate) but tracks them for 40 years, instead of 30 years. The figure shows that
the amortization rate indeed converges to one and mortgage installments become essentially
zero by the 140th period (the 35th year). Higher order polynomials, such as (1 − δDt −
δ2Dt)δ
α1
Dt + (δDt)δ
α2
Dt + (δ
2
Dt)δ
α3
Dt, can improve the precision even further.
B.3 Computation
The equilibrium is computed by combining the linear-quadratic approximation methods of
Hansen and Prescott (1995) and Benigno and Woodford (2006). Specifically, after trans-
forming the model so that it is specified in terms of stationary variables pit and d˜t ≡ dt/pt−1
(instead of nonstationary variables pt and dt), the home production function (2) and the
budget constraint (9), with lt and mt substituted out from equations (8) and (10), are
substituted in the period utility function u(., .). The utility function is then used to form
a Lagrangian that has the nonlinear laws of motion (11)-(13) as constraints. This La-
grangian forms the return function in the Bellman equation to be approximated with a
linear-quadratic form around a nonstochastic steady state, with the variables expressed
as percentage deviations from steady state. The steps for computing equilibria of dis-
torted linear-quadratic economies, described by Hansen and Prescott (1995), then follow;
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with a vector of exogenous state variables Ωt = [zt, ..., zt−n], a vector of endogenous state
variables Φt = [s1t, ..., sJ−1,t, kMt, kHt, d˜t, δDt, Rt], and a vector of decision variables Υt =
[hMt, hHt, xHt, sJt, d˜t+1, δD,t+1, Rt+1, λ1t, λ2t, λ3t], where λ1t, λ2t, λ3t are Lagrange multipliers
for the non-linear constraints (11)-(13).28 The use of the Lagrangian ensures that second-
order cross-derivatives of the nonlinear laws of motion (11)-(13), evaluated at steady state,
appear in equilibrium decision rules (Benigno and Woodford, 2006). The usual procedure
of substituting out d˜t+1, δD,t+1, and Rt+1 from these laws of motion into the period utility
function is not feasible here as these three variables are interconnected in a way that does
not allow such substitution. The Lagrangian is
Lt = u (c(cMt, cHt), 1− hMt − hHt) + λ1t [dt+1 − (1− δDt)dt − lt]
+λ2t [δD,t+1 − (1− νt)δαDt − νtκ] + λ3t [Rt+1 − (1− νt)Rt − νtit] ,
with the remaining constraints of the household’s problem substituted in the consumption
aggregator c(., .), as mentioned above. For our calibration, the steady-state values of the
Lagrange multipliers (λ1t, λ2t, λ3t) are positive, implying that the above specification of the
Lagrangian is correct in the neighborhood of the steady state.
The Lagrange multipliers are convenient for computing the wedge, τHt. Notice from
equation (16) that the wedge depends on conditional expectations of the derivatives of the
value function. The multipliers, which are obtained as an outcome of the solution method,
provide a straightforward way of computing these expectations. The mapping between the
multipliers and the expectations is obtained from the first-order conditions for dt+1, δD,t+1,
and Rt+1 in the household’s problem. Forming the Bellman equation
V (zt, ..., zt−n, s1t, ..., sJ−1,t, kMt, kHt, dt, δDt, Rt)
= max {Lt + βEtV (zt+1, ..., zt−n+1, s1,t+1, ..., sJ−1,t+1, kM,t+1, kH,t+1, dt+1, δD,t+1, Rt+1)} ,
the respective first-order conditions are
λ1t + λ2t
[
(1− δDt)δαDtdt + ptθκxHt
d2t+1
]
+ λ3t
[
(1− δDt)dtRt + ptθitxHt
d2t+1
]
+ βEtVd,t+1 = 0,
λ2t + βEtVδD,t+1 = 0,
λ3t + βEtVR,t+1 = 0.
When the model is transformed so that it is specified in terms of pit and d˜t, rather than pt
and dt, the first of these conditions changes to
λ˜1t + λ2t
[
(1− δDt)δαDtd˜t
(1 + pit)d˜2t+1
+
θκxHt
d˜2t+1
]
+ λ3t
[
(1− δDt)d˜tRt
(1 + pit)d˜2t+1
+
θitxHt
d˜2t+1
]
+ βEtV˜d,t+1 = 0,
where λ˜1t ≡ ptλ1t.
An alternative computational procedure would be to use log-linearization of the equi-
28In the version with residential time to build, the nιt’s become a part of Φt and n
∗
t becomes a part of Υt,
but with q∗t being its counterpart in the aggregate counterpart to Υt.
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librium conditions around the nonstochastic steady state. This procedure yields the same
decision rules as the one employed here (Benigno and Woodford, 2006). An advantage of
our procedure is the convenience for computing the wedge.
C. VAR processes
The exogenous VAR process used in Section 5 is estimated on U.S. data for logged and
linearly detrended Solow residual, the interest rate on the conventional 30-year FRM, and
the CPI inflation rate. The series for the Solow residual is taken from the data accompanying
Gomme and Rupert (2007). The capital stock used for the construction of the residual is the
sum of structures and equipment & software (current costs deflated with the consumption
deflator), which is consistent with our mapping of kMt into the data in the rest of the
calibration. The number of lags in the VAR is determined by the likelihood ratio test. The
point estimates (ignoring the constant term) are
zt+1 =
 0.933 −0.543 −0.2830.023 0.953 0.020
0.021 0.431 0.246
 zt +
 0.118 −0.070 0.183−0.016 −0.134 0.036
0.111 −0.249 0.164
 zt−1
+
 −0.147 0.633 0.1170.036 −0.011 0.043
−0.084 −0.197 0.187
 zt−2 +
 0.0049 0 00.0002 0.0009 0
−0.0011 0.0009 0.0026
 ²t+1,
where zt = [logAMt, it, pit]
> and ²t+1 ∼ N(0, I). These point estimates are used to solve
the model and run the computational experiments in Sections 5 and 6. Note that as in our
computational experiments we are interested only in unconditional moments, the ordering
of the variables in the VAR is irrelevant.
In some experiments in Section 6, the FRM interest rate is replaced with the 3-month
T-bill yield and the ARM rate. The point estimates are, respectively,
zt+1 =
 0.912 −1.491 −0.1640.049 1.449 0.030
0.076 0.719 0.255
 zt +
 0.063 2.124 0.217−0.046 −0.412 −0.014
0.101 −0.777 0.158
 zt−1
+
 −0.295 −2.329 0.055−0.003 −0.039 −0.029
−0.143 0.431 0.204
 zt−2 +
 0.311 1.294 0.1300.020 −0.048 −0.019
−0.016 −0.179 −0.175
 zt−3
+
 0.0044 0 00.0001 0.0008 0
−0.0010 0.0007 0.0026
 ²t+1
and
zt+1 =
 0.885 −1.173 −0.2840.025 1.214 0.026
0.048 0.402 0.267
 zt +
 0.170 0.033 0.200−0.039 −0.219 0.024
0.084 −0.074 0.151
 zt−1
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+ −0.121 1.006 0.1980.033 −0.109 −0.011
−0.099 −0.275 0.153
 zt−2 +
 0.0047 0 00.0001 0.0007 0
−0.0011 0.0006 0.0027
 ²t+1.
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Figure A.1: Mortgage loan: model (with κ = 0.00162 and α = 0.9946) v.s. real-
world mortgage (Yahoo mortgage calculator). Solid line=model, dashed line=real-
world mortgage. Here, l0 = $250, 000 and i = 9.28%/4. The approximation error is
expressed as the present value (using 1/i) of the difference between the installments
in the model and in the mortgage calculator, divided by the size of the loan.
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Figure A.2: Mortgage loan: model (with κ = 0.00162, α1 = 0.9974, and α2 =
0.7463) v.s. real-world mortgage (Yahoo mortgage calculator). Solid line=model,
dashed line=real-world mortgage. Here, l0 = $250, 000 and i = 9.28%/4. The
approximation error is expressed as the present value (using 1/i) of the difference
between the installments in the model and in the mortgage calculator, divided by
the size of the loan.
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Figure A.3: Mortgage loan with κ = 0.00162, α1 = 0.9974, and α2 = 0.7463,
payments over 40 years.
59
